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ABSTRACT
Background: Comprehension of non-canonical sentences is fre-
quently characterised by chance level performance in people with
aphasia (PWA). Chance level performance has been interpreted as
guessing, but online data does not support this rendering. It is still
not clear whether the incorrect sentence processing is guided by
the compensatory strategies that PWA might employ to overcome
linguistic difficulties.
Aims: We aim to study to what extent people with non-fluent
aphasia are aware of their sentence comprehension deficits.
Methods & Procedures: This study combined offline and online
data to investigate the effect of word order and error-awareness
on sentence comprehension in a group of PWA and non-brain
damaged (NBD) participants. The offline tasks involved auditory
sentence picture-matching immediately followed by a confi-
dence rating (CR). Participants were asked to judge the per-
ceived correctness of their previous answer. Online data
consisted of eye-tracking.
Outcomes & Results: Replicating previous findings, PWA had
significantly worse comprehension of Theme-Agent order com-
pared to Agent-Theme order sentences. Controls showed ceil-
ing level sentence comprehension. CR was a poor predictor of
response accuracy in PWA, but moderate-good in NBD. A total
of 6.8% of judgements were classified as “guessing” by PWA.
Post hoc gaze data analysis indicated that CR was a predictor
of the fixation pattern during the presentation of the linguistic
stimuli.
Conclusions: Results suggest that PWA were mostly unaware of
their sentence comprehension errors and did not consciously
employ strategies to compensate for their difficulties.
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Introduction
Word order and sentence comprehension deficits in people with aphasia (PWA)
Sentence comprehension deficits in agrammatic aphasia have been well established in
the literature over the past few decades. In the absence of lexical comprehension
deficits, semantically reversible sentences presented in non-canonical word orders (the
terms canonical vs. non-canonical refer to the base word order in a certain language
(e.g., SVO in Spanish) vs. the rest of word orders allowed in the language (e.g., OVS, VSO,
VOS)) are frequently misunderstood by people with non-fluent aphasia (PWA) (e.g.,
Caplan & Hildebrandt, 1988; Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Grodzinsky, 2000; Schumacher
et al., 2015; Thompson et al., 2013; see Grodzinsky, Piñango, Zurif, & Drai, 1999; for a
review). Both semantic reversibility and word order are key in understanding this
difficulty. When both Determiner Phrases (DPs) of a sentence are animate and potential
agents of the action (i.e., the sentence is reversible), PWA show better comprehension of
sentences presented in Agent-Theme order (henceforth A-T) (e.g., The girl calls the
teacher) than in Theme-Agent order (henceforth T-A) (e.g., The teacher has been called
by the girl). This is because in the former, listeners may rely solely on word order
information to disentangle the thematic-role assignment, while in the latter they are
forced to process morphological information to parse and reach the correct interpreta-
tion of the sentence.
Typologically, the more (case and agreement) morphology a language has, the
greater freedom it displays in sentence word order. However, deficits in comprehending
sentence in T-A argument order have been found in PWA speakers of languages with
more rigid word order (i.e., in English, Meyer, Mack, & Thompson, 2012; Schwartz,
Saffran, & Marin, 1980; in Dutch, Bastiaanse & Edwards, 2004), flexible word order (i.e.,
in Spanish, Juncós-Rabadán, Pereiro, & Souto, 2009; in German, Burchert, De Bleser, &
Sonntag, 2003; in Italian, Garraffa & Grillo, 2008; in Turkish, Duman, Altinok, Özgirgin, &
Bastiaanse, 2011; in Swahili, Abuom, Shah, & Bastiaanse, 2013; cf. in Indonesian, Jap,
Martínez-Ferreiro, & Bastiaanse, 2016), and free word order (i.e., in Basque, Arantzeta
et al., 2017).
To date, most studies on sentence comprehension have used offline methods to
address the ways in which PWA and non-brain-damaged (NBD) individuals process
sentences in order to assign grammatical functions and thematic roles. The sentence–
picture matching task has typically been used in both experimental and clinical
settings. The participant needs to choose, within a set of two (or more) visual stimuli,
the picture that best matches the target sentence. Although the results are easy to
quantify, it is necessary to consider that the odds of picking the target picture by
chance are relatively large. Thus, to compare results against chance, accuracy scores
at chance level have been traditionally attributed to guessing by the Trace Deletion
Hypothesis (TDH; Grodzinsky, 1986, 1995, 2000; see Drai & Grodzinsky, 2006a, 2006b
for a later revision). Based on the tenets of the Principles and Parameters model of
generative grammar (Chomsky, 1981), the TDH states that agrammatism precludes
the creation of a chain between the moved element and the trace in its original
position. According to the TDH, traces of movement are not available to PWA.
Consequently, when presented with passive sentences with non-canonical T-A
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order, PWA cannot assign thematic roles to a moved argument and apply instead a
default strategy that assigns the role of Agent to the first DP in the sentence. The
argument in the by-phrase gets the correct thematic role, and therefore, the sentence
appears to have two agents. Accordingly, the TDH states that PWA resolve this
conflict by choosing randomly between the two potential interpretations of the
sentence. Thus, the TDH predicts that PWAs will perform at chance level in the
comprehension of sentences with non-canonical A-T word order.
The above-mentioned guessing interpretation is related to one important limitation
of offline sentence comprehension tasks. Offline methods are static in the sense that
they measure how participants interpret a sentence once its presentation has con-
cluded, but they do not provide information related to the timing involved on specific
interpretations. Online methodologies address this limitation, allowing monitoring of
performance as it takes place.
Eye-tracking studies on sentence comprehension deficits
To examine real-time sentence processing, several studies have used eye-tracking
technology in the Visual World Paradigm (VWP). The VWP is based on the idea that
the linguistic stimuli mediate visual attention shifts within a visual display due to
referentially driven processes (Cooper, 1974; Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, &
Tanenhaus, 1995; see Boland, 2004; Tanenhaus, 2007; for an overview). Participants’
eye fixations on pictures in a scene are monitored as participants listen to sentences.
Changes in the location and timing of fixations during the sentence presentation reveal
how visual attention shifts in response to the continuous auditory stimuli. Some findings
suggest that language-mediated eye gaze tends to be unconscious, but not fully
automatic (Mishra, Olivers, & Huettig, 2013). Current data suggest that the VWP provides
a sensitive measure of word order processing in sentence comprehension.
Dickey, Choy, and Thompson (2007) introduced the VWP in aphasiology research in a
study on wh-questions. They found that the comprehension of non-canonical object wh-
questions was at chance level in PWA. Interestingly, gaze data analysis did not converge
with the traditional interpretation of chance level accuracy (i.e., guessing) (TDH;
Grodzinsky, 1986; 1995, 2000; see Drai & Grodzinsky, 2006a, 2006b for a later revision;
see Burchert, Hanne, & Vasishth, 2013; for a review). PWA showed distinct fixation
patterns in the correctly and incorrectly answered trials. In the correctly answered trials,
PWA showed the same gaze fixation pattern of NBD participants, indicating rapid and
automatic thematic role assignment. In contrast, in the incorrectly answered trials, PWA
showed a completely different gaze-fixation pattern, characterised by a progressive
proportion of fixations towards the foil picture. Similar results have been reported in
subsequent studies combining VWP with a sentence–picture matching task in English
(Dickey & Thompson, 2009), German (Hanne, Sekerina, Vasishth, Burchert, & De Bleser,
2011; Schumacher et al., 2015), and Basque (Arantzeta et al., 2017) PWA. Altogether,
evidence from online data does not support the existence of a guessing pattern in
sentence processing in PWA, but distinctive parsing routines that determine the inter-
pretation of the sentence. In successful interpretations of the sentence, PWA show a
processing pattern comparable to NBD, but it is still unclear what processes underlie
sentence misinterpretation.
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Online data analysis of incorrect answers might provide insights regarding the
intermittent and hardly predictable (i.e., stochastic) failure shown by PWA in proces-
sing sentences with non-canonical word orders. However, this analysis is often
challenging due to the small sample sizes and noisy data (see Caplan, Waters,
DeDe, Michaud, & Reddy, 2007 for an alternative across-task/measures approach). It
has been suggested that PWA fail to comprehend sentences with non-canonical word
order due to their inability to inhibit conflicting information (Dickey et al., 2007;
Dickey & Thompson, 2009; Schumacher et al., 2015), for example, the influence of
agent-first heuristics. This refers to the tendency to assign the agent role to the first
DP in the sentence (Bever, 1970; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2013). This
heuristic achieves correct interpretation of sentences presented in the canonical word
order, also in healthy speakers (Ferreira & Patson, 2007; Townsend & Bever, 2001; Van
Herten, Chwilla, & Kolk, 2006), but it fails to correctly assign thematic roles in derived
word orders. In those cases, listeners must revise the initial parsing by applying more
effortful analytical computations. Hanne et al. (2011) suggested that PWA have an
early preference for interpreting sentences as canonical or non-canonical based on a
“deterministic parsing”, followed by the inability to revise the initial parsing computa-
tion, even when they detect the need for reanalysis. Still, it is an open question
whether the use of heuristics by PWA is a consciously learned and self-initiated
procedure to compensate for their linguistic deficits, or whether it reflects an uncon-
scious breakdown of parsing routines.
Consciousness and compensatory strategies in PWA
Provided that PWA do not show anosognosia (i.e., unawareness of the aphasia) (see
Kertesz, 2010; Vuilleumier, 2004; for an overview), PWA can use self-initiated compensa-
tory strategies to overcome their communicative impairments. These might be external
(e.g., ask for adaptations to the interlocutor, use of electronic devices) or internal (e.g.,
self-cuing, verbal repetition, mental association) (e.g., Beeke, Wilkinson, & Maxim, 2009;
Oelschlaeger & Damico, 1998; Tompkins, Scharp, & Marshall, 2006; see Simmons-Mackie
& Damico, 1997).
Within sentence comprehension, the use of heuristics reduces processing time and effort
in parsing routines when compared to analytical processes (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008; see
also Ferreira & Patson, 2007). There is evidence suggesting that the PWA have limited
resource availability to process the linguistic stimuli (Caplan et al., 2007; Kolk, 1993;
Miyake, Carpenter, & Just, 1994). Thus, PWA may adopt a conscious shortcut to diminish
the cognitive load involved in the parsing process. Among the languages studied in
sentence processing in PWA, none has Theme-Agent order as its canonical structure.
Indeed, this is a rare pattern shown by less than the 4% of the languages worldwide
(Dryer, 2005). The frequency of appearance of structures is a primary criterion to determine
word order typology across languages; thus, structures with non-canonical word order tend
to be less frequent than structures with canonical word order (Dryer, 2007). Hence, if we
consider the above factors, reliance on agent-first strategy may be considered as the “best
guess” under an arbitrary degree of success. It is unknown to what extent the adoption of an
agent-first strategy by PWA is based on a conscious decision that aids comprehension
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efficiency on an everyday basis. The focus lies in establishing a threshold between the
conscious and unconscious processing of language.
Metacognitive tasks assess self-awareness and, hence, consciousness (Seth, Dienes,
Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008; see Peña-Ayala & Cárdenas, 2015; for an
overview). Metacognitive awareness refers to the subjective perception of one’s
own cognitive process. It can be measured by the subjective Confidence Ratings
(CRs) self-reported by the subject in a given task (see Norman & Price, 2015).
Participants perform a primary task (e.g., picture matching) and subsequently are
asked to rate their confidence in the validity of their decision. The degree of
correspondence between the objective performance (i.e., accuracy) and the subjective
CR is used to assess the extent to which the primary task is mediated by conscious
knowledge (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986; Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995;
Overgaard, Timmermans, Sandberg, & Cleeremans, 2010). Conscious cognition is
strongly associated with voluntary control. However, voluntary actions become auto-
matic with practice (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) and consequently, the cognitive
control over them decreases (e.g., Langer & Imber, 1979; Schneider, 2009). Hence, it
is important to keep in mind that there is some degree of contribution of conscious
and unconscious knowledge across most cognitive tasks.
Note that a judgement based on CR is certainly a constituent of conscious awareness,
but it may be the product of an unconscious inference. What is important is that once
the judgement is built, it may augment self-control, and therefore the degree of
personal regulation over processes that would otherwise influence behaviour directly
(Koriat, 2000). Dienes et al. (1995) suggested two criteria to use CRs to distinguish
between conscious and unconscious knowledge: the zero-correlation criterion and the
guessing criterion. The former refers to the lack of relationship between CR and objec-
tive accuracy, while the latter refers to the observed above-chance performance in the
primary task when participants say they are guessing. According to the authors, the
fulfilment of these two criteria is a strong indicator of unconscious processing. This
paradigm has been used mostly in perceptual discrimination and implicit learning tasks
(Norman & Price, 2015; Overgaard, 2015; for an overview). In the current study, it is
applied for the first time in an aphasiology study.
Studies of metacognitive awareness in comprehension deficits have been mainly on
jargon aphasia (Marshall, Rappaport, & Garcia-Bunuel, 1985; Shuren, Hammond, Maher,
Rothi, & Heilman, 1995; see Rubens & Garret, 1991; for an overview). To the best of our
knowledge, the only study on comprehension error awareness in non-fluent PWA was
conducted by Kennedy and Chiou (2008), who studied a group of Broca’s and anomic
PWA regarding metacognitive awareness on discourse-related questions. Kennedy and
Chiou (2008) reported that metacognitive awareness was mainly explained by the
linguistic abilities of the PWA (discourse comprehension and design fluency repetition
score), but also executive functions, such as switching and perseveration, contributed to
a lesser extent (see also Stuss, 1991).
PWA have difficulties comprehending sentences presented in derived word orders.
We aimed to study the extent to which they are aware of their comprehension difficul-
ties, and whether they use conscious strategies to compensate them. Comprehension
accuracy and self-reported CRs were considered during a comprehension task involving
canonical and non-canonical sentences.
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Research questions
Behavioural data were collected using a sentence–picture matching task, followed by a
CR. Moreover, participants were monitored with an eye-tracker while performing the
primary task (i.e., sentence–picture matching task) as an online measure of sentence
processing. The latter aimed to further explore, in a post hoc analysis, the interaction
between self-awareness and real-time sentence processing. This study poses three
research questions:
(1) Are PWA aware of their sentence comprehension errors?
The CRs reported for the incorrectly answered trials were studied to uncover the extent
to which PWA performed a correct judgement of their (failed) comprehension accuracy.
Correct judgements of incorrectly answered trials were considered as an indicator of error
awareness in sentence comprehension. In contrast, incorrect judgements of incorrectly
answered trials suggest that PWA were not aware of their comprehension errors.
(2) Is sentence comprehension performance unconsciously mediated in PWA and
NBD?
Following Dienes et al. (1995), this research question was answered based on the
zero-correlation criterion and the guessing criterion. In relation to the zero-correlation
criterion, the absence of correspondence between objective comprehension perfor-
mance and subjective CR is an indicator of unconscious knowledge. The opposite
pattern would be indicative of consciously mediated processing, and therefore voluntary
control over thematic-role parsing. Regarding the guessing criterion, above-chance
performance in trials where participants believed that they were guessing indicate
unconscious knowledge (i.e., implicit knowledge) of sentence processing.
(3) To what extent do PWA answer by guessing on a task for comprehension of
sentences in non-canonical argument order?
Descriptive analysis of the data was used to add further evidence on the validity of the
TDH (Grodzinsky, 1986, 1995, 2000; see Drai & Grodzinsky, 2006a, 2006b for a later
revision). As described before, the TDH states that PWA answer by guessing when
confronted with sentences presented in derived word orders. However, the TDH does
not explicitly report if the guessing act is a conscious/unconscious process. Based on the
definition of guessing as “form(ing) or express(ing) an uncertain estimate or conclusion
(about something), based on insufficient information” (Collins English Dictionary, 2012,
online version), in the current study we assume that it refers to a conscious act. Hence, the
self-rating of PWA will be used to explore whether the “guessing” pattern is conscious.
Methods
This study was approved by the Basque Clinical Research Ethics Committee (CEIC-E). All
participants, or legal tutors, gave informed consent according to the declaration of Helsinki.
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Participants
A total of 14 individuals (mean age 66.07 years; SD = 10.38; range = 55–85; male/
female = 11:3) with chronic non-fluent aphasia were tested in this study. Half of them
were native Spanish monolingual speakers, whereas the others were L1Basque-L2Spanish
bilingual speakers. All bilingual participants had acquired Spanish at an early age (<5 years)
and were literate only in Spanish, their language of instruction at school. For more
information on sentence comprehension abilities as a function of bilingualism, see
Arantzeta (2017). They were all pre-morbidly right-handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and presented with aphasia due to cerebrovascular
injury. Visual neglect was excluded using the Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson,
Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987). A total of 14 individuals without any history of neurological
or sensory impairments composed the NBD group. They were matched on age range and
bilingualism with the clinical group (mean age 62.92 years; SD = 12.04; range = 44–82;
male/female = 8:6). Demographic, linguistic, and clinical information is provided in Table 1.
PWA were screened in Spanish for word and sentence comprehension abilities using
the extended version of the Boston Aphasia Test (BDAE; Goodglass, Kaplan, & Barresi,
2005; Adapted to Spanish by García-Albea, 2005). The subsection of conversation and
language exposition, comprehension of words, commands, complex ideational materi-
als, and syntactic processing subsections were used. Furthermore, PWA were also
assessed for working memory using the digit-span task of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997). Scores from the subtests of the BDAE and
the WAIS-III are presented in Table 2.
Table 1. Demographic, linguistic, and clinical background information of the participants.
Participant Age Gender Education level Linguistic profile Y:M post-onset Location
A1 68 F 1 Bilingual 0:10 I- LMCA
A2 55 M 2 Bilingual 7:4 I-RMCA
A3 57 M 2 Bilingual 9:10 I- LMCA
A4 61 M 2 Bilingual 1:5 I- LMCA
A5 82 M 1 Bilingual 2:8 I- LMCA
A6 85 M 2 Bilingual 0:9 I- LMCA
A7 64 M 1 Bilingual 2:5 I- LMCA
A8 58 M 2 Monolingual >8:00 AE
A9 79 F 1 Monolingual 2:9 I-LMCA
A10 59 M 1 Monolingual 2:11 I- LMCA
A11 77 M 2 Monolingual 2:10 I- LMCA
A12 57 F 2 Monolingual 1:00 I-LMCA
A13 65 M 2 Monolingual 5:7 I- LMCA
A14 58 M 1 Monolingual 2:6 I- LMCA
C1 67 M 2 Bilingual n/a n/a
C2 54 M 2 Bilingual n/a n/a
C3 63 F 1 Bilingual n/a n/a
C4 58 F 1 Bilingual n/a n/a
C5 77 F 1 Bilingual n/a n/a
C6 82 M 2 Bilingual n/a n/a
C7 73 M 1 Bilingual n/a n/a
C8 44 F 2 Monolingual n/a n/a
C9 64 F 1 Monolingual n/a n/a
C10 58 M 3 Monolingual n/a n/a
C11 79 M 2 Monolingual n/a n/a
C12 53 F 2 Monolingual n/a n/a
C13 65 M 1 Monolingual n/a n/a
C14 44 M 2 Monolingual n/a n/a
F = female; M = male; 1 = elementary; 2 = technical; 3 = university; I-LMCA = ischemic-left middle cerebral artery;
I-RMCA = ischemic-right middle cerebral artery; AE = anoxic encephalopathy; n/a = not applicable.
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To be included in the present study, PWA showed relatively preserved lexical com-
prehension (>80%) and impaired sentence processing (<66%) as assessed by the “Touch
A with B” sub-test. This sub-test distinguishes a reversible relationship between sentence
constituents presented in a variety of word orders.
Design and materials
The materials used in this study were adapted to standard European Spanish from the
experiment presented by Arantzeta et al. (2017). They consisted of single sentences
provided auditorily in combination with the presentation of two pictures on the screen.
Each of the pictures depicted two people taking part in the performance of the same
action, but with reverse Agent-Theme thematic roles (see Figure 1). There were 126 trials
consisting of 120 experimental items and 6 practice items.
Picture-matching task
Linguistic stimuli
The same 22 transitive verbs used in the original study (Arantzeta et al., 2017) as well as
two animate singular DPs assigned to each verb were selected to create declarative
sentences in the following structures: (a) active; (b) passive; (c) subject relative; (d) object
relative; (e) subject cleft; (f) object cleft. Subsequently, sentence conditions were clus-
tered as Agent-Theme (A-T) and Theme-Agent (T-A) for data analysis. The Agent/Theme
assignment in the DPs was randomised and balanced within the six conditions. Regions
of interest (ROIs) of the experimental stimuli were individually measured using the
Computerized Language Analysis software (MacWhinney, 2000). t-Test comparisons of
ROI durations between paired conditions showed no differences (see Table 3).
Table 2. Summary of the individual scores obtained in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-
III; Wechsler, 1997) and the extended version of the Boston Aphasia Test (%) (BDAE; Goodglass,
Kaplan, & Barresi, 2005; Adapted to Spanish by García-Albea, 2005).
BDAE
WAIS-III Syntactic processing (%)
Participant
Digit-span
(pCTL)
Word
comprehension Commands
Complex ideational
material
Touching A
with B
Embedded
sentences
A1 68.8 100 86.66 41.66 58.33 60
A2 14.7 100 86.66 83.33 66.66 80
A3 68.8 94.59 100 75 58.33 60
A4 6.8 91.89 80 58.33 33.33 30
A5 14 86.48 66.66 41.66 16.66 70
A6 14 94.59 86.66 66.66 50 40
A7 – 91.89 73.33 50 25 50
A8 68.8 94.59 100 75 66.66 60
A9 0.7 94.59 80 83.33 33.33 90
A10 0 89.1 66.66 50 66.66 60
A11 14 94.59 86.66 91.66 33.33 90
A12 0 91.89 80 58.33 33.33 30
A13 – 81.08 – 50 16.66 60
A14 37.1 97.29 100 66.66 41.66 90
pCTL: percentile by age range.
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In the linguistic stimuli, the active sentences (1) were constructed with perfect
present tense to keep the length of the verb as equal as possible with the counterpart
passive sentences (2). In the relative clauses, the antecedent was always introduced by
the verbal phrase “I see” and the relative pronoun “que” functioning as subject (3) or
object (4). In the cleft sentence constructions, the contrastive element became the
complement of the copular verb “ser”, and the relativiser pronoun “que” introduced
the rest of the sentence (5–6). In both object-cleft and object-relative constructions, the
relative pronoun was preceded by the preposition “a”, as well as the direct object in the
cleft constructions.
(1) La mujer ha peinado a la niña
det woman aux.has comb-PTCP prep det girl
The woman has combed the girl
(2) La niña ha sido peinada por la mujer
det girl aux.has be-PTCP comb-PTCP prep det woman
The girl has been combed by the woman
Figure 1. Sample visual display. Target stimulus (Active): “El árbitro ha empujado al portero” (The
referee has pushed the goalkeeper). (a) Target picture; (b) Foil.
Table 3. Regions of Interest (ROI), duration (ms) (mean and SD), and comparison of length across
paired conditions.
ROI (mean duration and SD)
ROI 1
Argument 1
999 ms (46)
ROI 2
Verb
931 ms (12)
ROI 3
Argument 2
852 ms (30)
Paired conditions t p t p t p
Active vs. Passive 0.945 .350 −0.174 .863 −1.376 .177
Subj. vs. Obj. Relative −0.221 .826 −1.877 .068 1.268 .213
Subj. vs. Obj. Cleft 1.074 .290 −0.397 .693 0.366 .716
A-T vs. T-A −0.554 .581 −0.027 .177 0.077 .939
ROI: Region Of Interest; A-T: Agent-Theme; T-A: Theme-Agent.
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(3) Veo a la mujer que peina a la niña
see prep det woman pron-rel comb prep det girl
I see the woman who combs the girl
(4) Veo a la niña a la que peina la mujer
see prep det girl prep det pron-rel comb det woman
I see the girl who the woman combs
(5) Es la mujer la que peina a la niña
be det woman det rel-pron comb prep det girl
It is the woman who combs the girl
(6) Es a la niña a la que peina la mujer
be prep det girl prep det rel-pron comb det woman
It is the girl who the woman combs
Visual stimuli
The 44 black-and-white line drawings used by Arantzeta et al. (2017) were adapted for
the current study. The drawings constituted 22 pairs, which were presented together
divided by a black vertical line in the middle of the screen. The two pictures within each
pair showed the same action with an Agent-Theme reversal. See Arantzeta et al. (2017)
for detailed information on the visual stimuli and their corresponding normalisation.
The delivery of the visual stimuli was controlled to reduce adoption of particular spatial
strategies by PWA, as suggested by Chatterjee, Maher, and Heilman (1995). The presenta-
tion of the experimental items in the visual display (i.e., right vs. left) was pseudo-
randomised. No more than two target stimuli could occur in a row on the same side of
the screen. The direction in which the action was performed was also balanced across the
stimuli to avoid rightward-inclined scanning (Scheepers & Crocker, 2004).
Confidence rating
A three-interval CR was used and visually represented by coloured emoticons. From right
to left, a green smiley face, an amber neutral face, and a red sad face were presented
following a horizontal axis (seeFigure 2). The first (i.e., green smiley emoticon) and last (i.e.,
red sad emoticon) implied confidence of response to some degree, corresponding to
“sure, I answered correctly” and “sure, I answered incorrectly”, respectively. The middle
response alternative (i.e., amber neutral) corresponded to having no knowledge to report
the accuracy judgement, and it was defined as “I don’t know/guess”.
Procedure
The experiment was programmed using E-Prime 2.0.10 with extensions for Tobii 2.0.2.41.
The visual stimulus was presented on a 23ʺ wide screen LED monitor having 1280 × 720
resolution. The auditory stimuli were delivered binaurally through headphones.
Participants were seated 60–70 cm from the screen, with a visual angle under 15°
(max. allow 35°), while their eye movements were captured using a Tobii 120 Desktop
Eye Tracker (sampling rate 120 Hz).
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The presentation of the experimental stimuli was divided into four blocks of 30 items.
Two blocks were administered in each of the two experimental sessions, after the
presentation of six practice items. No more than two consecutive items corresponded
to the same linguistic condition.
Prior to the start of the presentation of each block of stimuli, a 5-point calibration
sequence was used to calibrate the eye-tracker to each subject. Subsequently, written
instructions for the task appeared on the screen. The same instructions were also read
aloud and verbally explained to all participants.
The experiment consisted of two consecutive tasks. In the primary task, the participants
were asked to perform a picture-matching task, while in the secondary task they were asked
to report the perceived correctness of their previous answer using a confidence rate.
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation smiley face was centred in the screen.
Participants had to fixate on the image for 250 ms before it was replaced by the display
of a pair of pictures corresponding to the experimental stimuli. After 1000 ms of pre-
visualisation, the auditory stimulus was presented. Participants were asked to select the
picture that best depicted the auditorily presented sentence by pressing specific keys on
the keyboard with the left hand. As an exception, a participant with crossed aphasia (A2)
answered with the right hand. Trials with no response within 8000 ms from the offset of
the sentence were counted as having no response. When the decision was made, the
second task was introduced. Participants were asked to make a CR as an assessment of
the accuracy of their response on the previous task (i.e., picture-matching task). To this
end, the three colour emoticons appeared on the screen and participants had to select
the one that best represented their judgement. They were allowed to make their choice
by pressing specific buttons on the keyboard or pointing directly on the screen. CRs
provided by pointing directly on the screen were entered by the researcher using a
second keyboard. The participants had a maximum of 12,000 ms to answer. After this
time, the CR was registered as not being answered and the next trial was started. Trials
answered before the onset of the auditory presentation (i.e., pre-visualisation face) were
excluded from subsequent data analysis, corresponding to the 0.25% of the total data.
In both the first and second tasks, trials with no responses were excluded from further
analysis, corresponding to 1.28% and 0.58% of the total data, respectively. Fixations with
durations less than 90 ms were removed from the analysis to exclude ocular artefacts
(e.g., blinks and saccades). We introduced a switch of 200 ms to correct for the time
Figure 2. Response grid used to self-report confidence rate on the accuracy of the sentence–picture
matching task.
The emoticons represented the next confidence rates: green smiley face = “sure, I answered correctly”; amber
neutral face = “I don´t know/guess”; red sad face = “sure, I answered incorrectly”.
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required for planning and executing an eye-movement, and thereby, to time align the
gaze-fixation data with the linguistic stimuli (Matin, Shao, & Boff, 1993).
The difference in the proportion of fixations between the target and foil pictures was
computed across different temporal ROIs. ROI 1 corresponded to the subject/object of
the main clause or the antecedent of the relative clause; ROI 2 corresponded to the
(relative pronoun +) verbal phrase; and ROI 3 corresponded to the subject/object of the
verbal phrase. In addition, a post-offset ROI 4 with a duration of 1120 ms was included.
Missing gaze data were imputed in the trials answered before the offset of ROI 4 (i.e.,
mean RT <3902 ms) based on the accuracy of the response.
Data analysis
Comprehension accuracy data and post hoc gaze data analysis were conducted using
Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Models (GLMM) with logit function, and Linear Mixed-
effects Models (LMM), respectively. GLMM combine both fixed and random effects of
known variables in a single model (see Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). To the
specific case of our study, GLMM are suitable to address the variability across partici-
pants/stimuli, outliers, and missing data, a common characteristic of PWA, small sample
sizes, and time-series data. For a detailed discussion on these statistical aspects, see
Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, and Zeger (2002) and Verbeke and Molenberghs (2000).
Model building was conducted by progressively introducing random effects, fixed
effects, and corresponding interactions. Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974) was
used to measure the goodness of fit and compare models with each other. The numerical
predictors Age and Trial number were centred. Least squares means (LSMeans) were used
for comparing LSMean differences on the basis of the mixed model.
Specific procedures were followed to test the zero-correlation and guessing criterions.
Zero-correlation criterion was analysed with simple Logistic Regression Models (LRM) fitted
with a logit link function, in addition to the estimation of the area under the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. In relation to the zero-correlation criterion, the absence
of correspondence between objective comprehension performance and subjective CR is an
indicator of unconscious knowledge. Thus, the area under the curve (AUC) is the probability
that participants correctly rate their accuracy. The nonparametric approach of DeLong
(DeLong, DeLong, & Clarke-Pearson, 1988) was used to compare the AUCs between groups.
The guessing criterion was examined using GLMM, by comparing the linear predictor with
zero. LSMeans and 95% CIs were used for this purpose.
Tukey and Bonferroni correction was used to control the error rate in testing multiple
comparisons on behavioural (i.e., accuracy and CR) and gaze-fixation data, respectively.
The statistical software R was used for this analysis (R Core Team, 2015, v.3.2.3.).
Results
Comprehension accuracy
Sentence conditions were clustered as Agent-Theme (A-T) and Theme-Agent (T-A). The
former included active, subject cleft and subject relative conditions, while the latter
included the counter pairs: passives, object clefts, and object relatives.
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PWA correctly comprehended 79% (Standard Error, SE = 1.42) of the sentences in A-T
order and 65% (SE = 1.67) of the sentences presented in T-A order. The NBD group
performed at ceiling level obtaining 96% (SE = 0.69) accuracy in A-T and 96% (SE = 0.64)
accuracy in T-A argument orders. Detailed statistics on sentence comprehension scores by
argument orders are presented in Table 4. Individual participants’ scores are in Appendix A.
In the final GLMM, the predictors of interest were the group (PWA, NBD), argument
order (A-T, T-A), and trial number (from 1 to 120, the position of the presentation of a
given trial in relation to the others). There was a two-way interaction between group
and argument order, and group and trial number, as well as three-way interaction
between group, argument order, and trial number. By means of random effects, we
accounted for variability within-participants (i.e., participants that answered one trial
correctly would be more likely to answer other trials correctly) and within stimuli (i.e.,
some stimuli may be more difficult than other).
The PWA performed significantly poorer than the NBD across both A-T
(β = −2.029; SE = 0.324; p = < .0001) and T-A (β = −2.703; SE = 0.305; p = < .0001)
argument orders. The PWA comprehended sentences presented in A-T better than
T-A argument order (β = 0.754; SE = 0.120; p = < .0001), while the people with NBD
showed no effect of word order (β = 0.080; SE = 0.277; p = .7728). In addition, there
was an interaction between group, argument order, and trial number. The NBD
participants became more accurate in the sentence-picture matching task across
the course of the experiment, but this improvement was restricted to sentences
presented in A-T argument order (A-T; β = −2.43; SE = 0.704; p = .0006. T-A;
β = −0.736; SE = 0.701; p = .2942). The PWA did not show any effect of trial number
across any of the argument orders (A-T; β = −0.414; SE = 0.343; p = .2278. T-A;
β = −0.327; SE = 0.330; p = .3229).
Confidence ratings
Participants expressed their confidence about the correctness of their answer in the
sentence–picture matching task by choosing one of the three options. The distribution
of the CRs is presented in Table 5, separately for correctly and incorrectly compre-
hended trials. See Figure 3 for an overall distribution of responses in each group.
Strikingly, both NBD participants and PWA believed they were correct on almost all
trials (97% for NBD and 87% for PWA). On the incorrect trials, PWA were sure that they
were right on 78% of occasions.
Table 4. Comprehension accuracy (%) and standard error (SE) as a function of group and sentence
condition.
Condition
Agent-Theme Theme-Agent
Group Active Subj. Cleft Subj. Rel. Passive Obj. Cleft Obj. Rel.
PWA 81.88% 79.92% 74.81% 74.34% 60.44% 61.62%
(2.32) (2.44) (2.60) (2.66) (2.99) (2.95)
NBD 98.17% 96.05% 93.18% 97.45% 96.78% 95.00%
(0.80) (1.16) (1.51) (0.95) (1.05) (1.30)
PWA: People With Aphasia; NBD: Non-Brain Damaged.
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Zero-correlation criterion
Data were sorted into correct/incorrect judgements. Correct judgements refer to the
instances in which participants reported as correct the trials answered correctly and
reported as incorrect the trials answered incorrectly. Thus, regardless of the accuracy of
Table 5. Distribution (%) of the confidence ratings within correctly and incorrectly answered trials in
both PWA and NBD groups.
PWA NBD
Response
accuracy
“sure,
I answered
correctly”
“I don’t know/
guess”
“Sure,
I answered
incorrectly”
“Sure,
I answered
correctly”
“I don’t know/
guess”
“Sure,
I answered
incorrectly”
Correct
answers
90.44% 5.71% 3.83% 98.37% 1.43% 0.18%
(n = 1060) (n = 67) (n = 45) (n = 1576) (n = 23) (n = 3)
Incorrect
answers
77.60% 9.53% 12.86% 49.23% 15.38% 35.38%
(n = 350) (n = 43) (n = 58) (n = 32) (n = 10) (n = 23)
PWA: People With Aphasia; NBD: Non-Brain Damaged.
Figure 3. Distribution (%) of the self-reported judgement of the sentence–picture matching task as a
function of response accuracy in both NBD and PWA groups.
Confidence rating 1 = “sure, I answered correctly”, 2 = “I do not know, guessing”, 3 = “sure, I answered
incorrectly”. NBD: non-brain damaged; PWA: people with aphasia.
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their response in the primary task (i.e., sentence–picture matching task), participants
made a correct judgement of their performance. Incorrect judgements refer to the cases
in which participants’ subjective self-report (i.e., CR) did not match with the correctness
of their answer in the sentence–picture matching task.
LRM analysis was conducted to explore the relationship between the outcome of
sentence comprehension accuracy and the CR provided by the participants. Separate
logit models were fitted for each group of participants to analyse the probability of each
group to correctly rate the accuracy of their response. ROC analysis considered together
the sensitivity (percentage of correctly identified incorrect answers) and the 1-specificity
(percentage of incorrectly identified incorrect answers) across a range of values, for the
ability to predict the sentence accuracy outcome. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.
In a hypothetical scenario, in which participants would use the confidence rates 100%
accurately to classify the accuracy of their response, the AUC would be 1. In our data, the
CR had an AUC of 0.56 (95% CI: 0.54–0.58) in the PWA group, just better than random
(i.e., 0.50), while the group with NBD had an AUC of 0.74 (95% CI: 0.68–0.81). A
Figure 4. Predicted probability of the confidence rating on the comprehension accuracy, illustrated
by the sensitivity (i.e., true positive rate) against 1-specificity (i.e., false positive rate).
NBD: non-brain damaged; PWA: people with aphasia. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a measure of how
well confidence ratings can distinguish between correctly and incorrectly answered trials.
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comparison of AUCs conducted by DeLong’s method uncovered significant differences
between the groups (p = < .0001).
Guessing criterion
The analysis considered if there was above chance accuracy in the sentence–picture
matching task in trials where participants declared to guess. In the GLMM, the predictors
of interest were the group (PWA, NBD) and CR (1, 2, 3) in a two-way interaction, and the
group (PWA, NBD) and argument order (A-T, T-A) in a two-way interaction. The random
effects accounted for the variability across participants and stimuli. In addition, we took
into consideration that there was differential variability in the effect of argument order
and sentence condition in each participant and stimulus. For example, the difficulty
imposed by argument order T-A was larger in some participants than in others, or the
difficulty imposed by object cleft sentence condition in some stimulus was greater than in
others. Note that although only LSMeans related to CR = 2 (i.e., “I don’t know/guess”) were
extracted to get insight the guessing criterion, we fitted a full model including CR as a
variable with three levels to avoid convergence problems. The use of a full model provides
statistical power to the results and decreases the possibility to obtain false negatives.
The guessing criterion was studied by comparing the linear predictor with zero in the
subset of items ranked CR = 2. Significantly positive values refer to instances in which
participants showed an above-chance accuracy rate when they believed that they were
guessing. The regression intercept was significantly positive in PWA (LSMean = 0.640;
SE = 0.305; 95% CI = 0.04–1.23; t(109) = 2.098; p = .0382) and those with NBD
(LSMean = 1.254; SE = 0.490; 95% CI = 0.29–2.21: t(32) = 2.557; p = .0155), indicating
above-chance accuracy. The same analysis was conducted separately as a function of
argument order. In the PWA group, the lower limit of the 95% CI was significantly
positive in sentences presented in A-T argument order (LSMean = 1.085; SE = 0.336; 95%
CI = 0.42–1.74; t(44) = 2.339; p = .0239), but not in sentences presented in T-A argument
order (LSMean = 0.196; SE = 0.325; 95% CI = −0.44–0.833; t(64) = 0.605; p = .5469). In the
group of people with NBD, the intercept was significantly positive across sentence
presented in A-T argument order (LSMean = 1.150; SE = 0.532; 95% CI = 0.10–2.19; t
(14) = 2.16; p = .0486), as well as in T-A argument order (LSMean = 1.358; SE = 0.526; 95%
CI = 0.32–2.39; t(17) = 2.579; p = .0195). In sum, in the trials in which PWA declared to
have guessed, the accuracy was better than expected by chance in A-T sentences, but
not in T-A sentences. Conversely, NBD performed better than at chance level in the two
argument orders.
Gaze data analysis
Post hoc analysis of the gaze data was conducted exclusively on the PWA, since the
accuracy and CR data were almost completely confounded in the NBD group, as shown
in Table 5. The empirical model included response accuracy (correct, incorrect), ROI (ROI
1, 2, 3, 4), and CR (1, 2, 3) as predictors. There was a two-way interaction between
response accuracy and ROI, and between response accuracy and confidence rate, as well
as a three-way interaction between response accuracy, confidence rate, and ROI. In
addition, the model included random effects for subject (i.e., the tendency of each
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participant to answer correctly or incorrectly) and stimulus (i.e., the degree of difficulty
that a specific stimulus may impose).
Previous studies using eye-tracking with the VWP have shown that gaze-fixations
diverge during the auditory presentation of the linguistic stimuli in correctly and
incorrectly comprehended trials (e.g., Arantzeta et al., 2017; Dickey & Thompson, 2009;
Hanne et al., 2011). Thus, the interaction between response accuracy and ROI was
expected. The detailed analysis of these results is reported by Arantzeta (2017).
In the current study we focus on the distinctive gaze-fixation pattern as a function of
response accuracy and CR (see Figure 5). The following results are based on gaze-fixation
differences along the visual display during the presentation of the linguistic stimuli as awhole.
In the correctly answered trials, PWA showed distinctive gaze-fixation routines in
sentences judged correctly (i.e., CR = 1) and in sentences judged incorrectly (i.e., CR = 3)
(β = 0.084; SE = 0.030; p = .0060). Trials rated with CR = 1 (i.e., “sure, I answered
correctly”) also corresponded to a different fixation pattern compared to trials in
which PWA reported to answer by guessing (i.e., CR = 2) (β = 0.071; SE = 0.024;
Figure 5. Fixation pattern of PWA across the visual display along the presentation of the auditory
stimuli.
The gaze data is presented as a function of response accuracy (correct, incorrect) and confidence rate (1, 2, 3).
Confidence rate, 1 = “sure, I answered correctly”, 2 = “I do not know, guessing”, 3 = “sure, I answered
incorrectly”. Values above .5 indicate more fixations into the target picture, whereas values below .5 indicate
more fixations into the foil picture.
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p = .0033). Nonetheless, the fixation pattern of the latter was indistinguishable from
incorrectly judged trials (i.e., CR = 3) (β = 0.013; SE = 0.038; p = .7305). In the incorrectly
answered trials, gaze-fixation pattern was significantly different between trials rated as
correctly understood (i.e., CR = 1) and trials rated as incorrectly understood (i.e., CR = 3)
by PWA (β = −0.93; SE = 0.028; p = .0008). There was no difference in the fixation
patterns of the trials where PWA reported they had guessed (i.e., CR = 2) versus trials
answered with certainty (perceived as correct, CR = 1; β = −0.027; SE = 0.031; p = .3847;
or those perceived as incorrect, CR = 3; β = −0.066; SE = 0.039; p = .0959).
The results of the three-way interaction between response accuracy, ROI, and CR are
detailed in Table 6.
To sum up, trials answered by guessing consistently showed a midpoint in the
proportion of fixations into the target/foil picture in relation to correctly and incorrectly
judged trials. This pattern was symmetric in correctly and incorrectly answered trials and
it was progressive during the presentation of the linguistic stimuli.
Discussion
The questions addressed in this study are: (a) Are PWA aware of their sentence
comprehension errors?; (b) Is sentence comprehension performance unconsciously
mediated in PWA and NBD?; (c) To what extent do PWA answer by guessing on a
task for comprehension of sentences in non-linear argument order? In addition, we
conducted a post hoc gaze data analysis to explore the relationship between real-
time sentence processing and the metacognitive awareness reported by PWA. This
section will first discuss the sentence comprehension accuracy data to contextua-
lise the subsequent discussion. Subsequently, the research questions will be
addressed attending to the zero-correlation criterion and guessing criterion
(Dienes et al., 1995).
As expected, PWA taking part in this study performed worse than NBD in the
sentence comprehension task. PWA comprehended sentences with a linear Agent-
Theme order better than the derived Theme-Agent order, and that applied across all
the three sentence sets. The NBD group comprehended sentences in both A-T and T-A
argument orders at ceiling level. Altogether, the present findings converge with those of
Arantzeta et al. (2017), whose linguistic and visual materials were adapted for the
present study, as well as with previous studies involving Spanish speakers with aphasia
(Juncós-Rabadán et al., 2009), and other languages (e.g., Abuom et al., 2013; Burchert
et al., 2003; Duman et al., 2011; Garraffa & Grillo, 2008; Meyer et al., 2012; Schwartz et al.,
1980; cf. Jap et al., 2016).
Metacognitive awareness of sentence comprehension accuracy differed significantly
between correct and incorrect responses. In the former, both NBD and PWA usually
made a correct judgement of their answer. That is, they perceived as correct the trials
answered correctly. PWA frequently rated incorrect trials as correct (i.e., false negative
detection). Hence, PWA were not aware of their sentence comprehension difficulties in
78% of the incorrectly answered trials. NBD made few comprehension errors, but
similarly only a few of these errors were correctly rated (i.e., 35% of the incorrectly
answered trials). This indicates that not even NBD participants are always aware of their
comprehension failures, possibly due to an age-related executive decline (see Martins,
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Joanette, & Monchi, 2015, for a review) that impacts awareness of error. This is a
potentially interesting experimental question, but it is beyond the immediate scope of
this study.
Zero-correlation criterion
Following Dienes et al. (1995), the degree of correspondence between the accuracy and
the CR was used to assess the conscious versus unconscious threshold in sentence
comprehension. The presence or absence of conscious awareness is a key element to
distinguish between explicit and implicit language processing, respectively. The consis-
tency between the measures varied across the two groups, suggesting that the extent to
which sentence comprehension is mediated by explicit processing varies as a conse-
quence of neurological injury. In the PWA group, the strength of the subjective percep-
tion (i.e., CRs) in predicting the comprehension accuracy was slightly above chance,
while in the NBD it was significantly larger, although not perfect.
The results suggest that PWA and NBD do not share the same consciousness thresh-
old in sentence processing. In the PWA group, sentence comprehension is mainly
mediated by implicit knowledge, suggesting little voluntary control. Consequently,
PWA do not consciously perceive failure in the parsing routine. In contrast, in the NBD
group, a moderate relationship between accuracy and CR suggests that explicit and
implicit knowledge appear to function together in thematic-role mapping in NBD. Note
that the lack of control shown in the PWA group cannot be explained by practice
(Langer & Imber, 1979; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), since agent-first heuristics have also
been proven to be deployed in healthy speakers (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky &
Schlesewsky, 2013; Ferreira & Patson, 2007; Van Herten et al., 2006). Still, NBD show a
moderate-good perception of the parsing mechanism, and reanalyse the sentence
based on analytical routines (i.e., by processing morphological cues) when the use of
heuristics fails to correctly interpret the sentence.
Guessing criterion
The analysis of the instances in which participants said they were guessing uncovered
two main things. First, both PWA and NBD rarely reported that their answer in the
comprehension task was based on uncertainty. This finding does not support the TDH
(Grodzinsky, 1986, 1995, 2000; see Drai & Grodzinsky, 2006a, 2006b for a later revision),
which states that PWA choose randomly when thematic roles need to be assigned in
non-linear order, as far as we assume that “guessing” is a conscious act. In contrast to
the predictions of the TDH, PWA nearly always tended to provide CRs (correct or
incorrectly) based on certainty (i.e., “sure, I answered right/wrong”) – they did not report
they were guessing. Second, according to the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995), the
two groups performed above chance in the trials in which they said they had guessed,
indicating unconscious knowledge of sentence processing. This effect was found in the
NBD group across all argument orders and in the PWA group in sentences presented in
A-T order. It suggests that PWA lack the required unconscious knowledge, or access to it,
to guide the processing of sentences presented in T-A argument order.
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Gaze-fixation data
Gaze data analysis showed that the CR provided by the participants trial-by-trial was
closely related to the gaze-fixation pattern. The interaction between the response
accuracy, confidence rate, and ROI suggests that in the trials that participants
believed to have answered correctly, correct and incorrect answers show distinctive
gaze-fixation pattern already during the presentation for the (relative pronoun +)
verbal phrase. Thus, positive confidence is characterised by an early commitment
towards one of the two potential interpretations of the sentence. In contrast, in the
trials perceived as guessed or incorrectly answered, the time window in which
participants commit for one of the interpretations is delayed until the noun phrase
following the verb. Altogether, CR of correctness, guessing, and incorrectness show a
progressive delay on sentence resolution. These results go against the TDH in that in
the trials rated with positive certainty (i.e., “sure, I answered correctly”), where most of
the trials are clustered, gaze-fixation pattern shows that PWA make a commitment
towards the target or foil picture already at verb position. Thus, opposite to the TDH,
PWA do not wait to hear the second DP to make a random choice between the two
potential interpretations of the sentence.
It is not possible to identify the causal direction of the relationship between real-time
sentence processing and the subjective perception of correctness in sentence compre-
hension. That is, we do not know whether the gaze fixations have an effect on the
subsequent individual perception of the correctness of the answer, or whether different
parsing routines, corresponding to different degrees of confidence, are reflected distinc-
tively in the gaze data of PWA. Certainly, the results of the post hoc analysis on the gaze-
data suggest that PWA did not randomly rate the perceived accuracy of their sentence
comprehension responses, for example as consequence of misinterpretation of the task.
Contrarily, the association shown between the CRs and the gaze-fixation pattern shows
that the rating of perceived correctness was guided by certain unconscious and auto-
matic regularities. So far, the data show that CRs are a sensitive measure of metacog-
nitive awareness.
Conclusions
The study of metacognitive awareness, and hence consciousness of processing, has
been widely neglected in aphasiology research regarding comprehension deficits. The
current study introduced behavioural and online methods in consciousness research of
PWA to get insight into the extent to which the participants’ responses are mediated by
conscious versus unconscious knowledge.
The relationship between comprehension accuracy and CR was studied to get insight
into the degree to which sentence processing was unconsciously mediated (i.e., zero-
correlation criterion; Dienes et al., 1995). We have gathered evidence suggesting that
NBD use both conscious and unconscious knowledge in sentence comprehension, since
their ability to perceive the correctness/incorrectness of their answer is high, although
not perfect. In contrast, in the PWA group, the CR is a very poor predictor of the
response accuracy, particularly because PWA do not tend to be aware of their misinter-
pretation of incorrectly answered trials. In contrast to NBD, PWA’s sentence processing is
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implicit and involves little voluntary control over the assignment of thematic roles. The
data show that PWA do not systematically overuse an explicit (i.e., conscious) strategy
such as agent-first heuristics, as the best probabilistic guess to reach the correct inter-
pretation of the sentences.
Regarding the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995), PWA had above-chance
performance in the comprehension of sentences presented in A-T order, even when
they claimed to be guessing, but not in sentences presented in T-A order. This
suggests that, unlike NBD participants, PWA do not show signs of the implicit knowl-
edge required for correct thematic role assignment. Note that participants believed
themselves to be guessing in very few responses. On the one hand, this indicates that
cautious interpretation of the guessing criterion is needed. On the other hand, the
pattern of responses is not compatible with the predictions of the TDH (Grodzinsky,
1986; 1995, 2000; see Drai & Grodzinsky, 2006a, 2006b for a later revision), which
claims that PWA answer by guessing when confronted with reversible sentences in
non-canonical word orders. Gaze data analysis contradicts this interpretation by show-
ing the correctly and incorrectly trials have distinctive gaze-fixation pattern from very
early on the presentation of the linguistic stimuli (see Arantzeta et al., 2017; Dickey &
Thompson, 2009; Hanne et al., 2011). The current study complements this evidence by
showing that the time point in which PWA make a commitment towards one or the
other interpretation is related to the confidence with which the trial is rated. Although
the causal direction of this relationship cannot be determined in the current study, it
demonstrates the validity of CR for obtaining insight into unconscious processes
in PWA.
In summary, PWA showed anosognosic behaviour towards sentence comprehension
deficits, even when they were aware of their aphasic condition. These results converge with
previous studies in jargon aphasia (see Rubens & Garrett, 1991). The lack of conscious
cognition, which is strongly linked with voluntary control, does not suggest that they use
explicit strategies to overcome their comprehension difficulties. Thus, awareness cannot be
taken as a self-regulatory mechanism for therapeutic applications in PWA, as suggested for
healthy individuals (Koriat, 2000). Further research is required to determine the relationship
between executive functions and sentence comprehension deficits in PWA.
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Appendix A.
Table A1. Individual scores (%) in the sentence–picture matching task attending to group and
argument order.
Argument order Argument order
Group = PWA
participant A-T T-A
Group = NBD
participant A-T T-A
A1 76.27 72.88 C1 96.67 98.31
A2 81.36 66.67 C2 93.33 96.67
A3 94.92 65.52 C3 96.61 98.33
A4 96.55 63.79 C4 100 91.67
A5 81.36 65.52 C5 94.83 95
A6 82.76 72.88 C6 93.22 94.92
A7 61.82 50 C7 91.53 96.49
A8 98.31 85.19 C8 96.67 100
A9 50 53.85 C9 96.55 100
A10 89.83 50.88 C10 95 96.67
A11 96.67 86.44 C11 96.67 96.67
A12 55.56 50.85 C12 96.67 96.67
A13 50 44.83 C13 95 95
A14 85 86.44 C14 98.31 93.33
PWA: people with aphasia; NBD: non-brain damaged; A-T: Agent-Theme; T-A: Theme-Agent.
For individual scores on sentence comprehension across conditions, we refer the reader to Arantzeta (2017).
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